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et al.: RECENT CASES

RECENT CASES
DIVORCE-Right of Wife in Property of Husband. Plaintiff sued his wife for divorce on grounds of desertion and
she countered for a limited divorce based on his cruelty. The
United States District Court for the District of Columbia
granted plaintiff a divorce and gave defendant $60,000.00
total alimony plus $60,000.00 which she had taken from their
joint safe deposit boxes. The sum awarded defendant was
found by this court to be in excess of 35% of the total value
of the plaintiff's property and he appeals from this property
award. On appeal, HELD, divorce affirmed, denial of petition
for a limited divorce affirmed; reversed and remanded as to
the property award. In the absence of some right or element
of ownership, legal or equitable, on part of a wife in her husband's property the court in a divorce case is without power
to order transfer of that property to her. Keleher v. Keleher,
192 F. 2d 601 (1951).
The general rule is that a wife in a divorce proceeding is not
entitled to have any specific parcel of real estate assigned as
her own. Wheeler v. Wheeler, 88 U. S. App. D. C. 193, 188 F.
2d 31 (1951) ; Phillis v. Philips, 106 Va. 105, 144 S. E. 875
(1928) ; Lovegrove v. Lovegrove, 128 Va. 449, 104 S. E. 804
(1920). This rule extends to the personal as well as the real
property of the parties. Ring v. Ring, 185 Va. 269, 38 S. E. 2d
471, 165 A. L. R. 1237 (1946) ; Barnes v. American Fertilizer
Co., 144 Va. 692, 130 S. E. 902 (1925). Although the courts
may not award the husband's property to the wife as alimony,
they may, in the enforcement of the alimony awarded to the
wife, place a lien on the husband's property. Selvy v. Selvy, 115
W. Va. 338, 177 S. E. 437 (1934) ; Nelson v. Nelson, 149 Minn.
285, 183 N. W. 354 (1921) ; Carnahanv. Carnahan,143 Mich.
390, 107 N. W. 73, 8 Ann. 53 (1906). The authority of the
courts, in actions for divorce, to transfer the property of
either party to the other, or otherwise to dispose of it, is
purely statutory. Anderson v. Anderson, 380 Ill. 435, 44 N. E.
2d 54 (1942); and inasmuch as the jurisdiction of divorce
cause is purely statutory, the court possesses no power not
granted to it by the statute. Mayes v. Mayes, 342 Mo. 401,
116 S. W. 2d 1 (1938) ; Mattison v. Mattison, 1 Strob. Eq. 387
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(S. C. 1847). On the other hand, the Washington court held in
Osetreich v. Osetreich, 2 Wash. 2d 72, 97 P. 2d 655 (1939),
that in divorce actions all property of spouses, both community and separate, is brought within the jurisdiction of the
court for disposal, and can be disposed of in any manner that
may be equitable and just, even to extent of awarding all the
property to the wife. However, the courts will not transfer
the property of the husband to the wife in fee simple, unless
the wife shows special equities justifying such transfer. Holm
v. Holm, 27 Wash. 2d 456, 178 P. 2d 725 (1947) ; Anderson v.
Anderson, supra. Thus, to warrant the court to direct a conveyance of property from one to the other, the special circumstances and equities must be alleged in the complaint.
Skoronski v. Skoronski, 395 Ill. 301, 69 N. E. 2d 690 (1946) ;
Podgornik v. Podgornik, 302 Ill. 124, 63 N. E. 2d 715 (1945).
Also, the relief granted against a defaulting defendant to
that demand in the plaintiff's pleadings is confined to only
what was asked for in the complaint. Rinker v. Rinker, 3 N. J.
Super 251, 64 A. 2d 910 (1949) ; Burtnett v. King, 33 Cal. 2d
805, 205 P. 2d 657, 12 A. L. R. 333 (1949) ; Johnson v. Swanson, 209 Ark. 144, 189 S. W. 2d 803 (1945). Where the pleadings put in issue the status of the property and the rights of
the parties therein, the court may determine whether the
property is separate or community and quiet title in the rightful owner, Huber v. Huber, 27 Cal. 2d 784, 167 P. 2d 708
(1946) ; and the courts may make such division of the community property, in reference to the condition of the parties,
as may be equitable and just. Donovan v. Donovan, 231 Iowa
14, 300 N. W. 656 (1941); Trimble v. Trimble, 15 Tex. 19
(1855). Where a divorce is granted to a wife for the husband's adultery, the court may in its discretion give all the
community property to her. Aston v. Aston, 14 Cal. App. 323,
111 P. 1035 (1910). Although, in the absence of statute a
court on decreeing a divorce from bed and board to the wife
cannot deprive her of dower or other marital rights in the
husband's estate, at least not without making compensation
therefor, Norman v. Norman, 88 W. Va. 640, 107 S. E. 407
(1921), where the statutes so provide, the wife on an absolute
divorce is entitled to a dower interest in the husband's real
property. Davol v. Howland, 14 Mass. 219 (1817). However,
the wife is not entitled to dower during the life of her husband. Tierney v. Tierney, 50 R. I. 105, 145 A. 444 (1929).
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137 South Carolina Statutes at Large, Section 12 (1949), as
amended by 46 South Carolina Statutes at Large (1950), provides: "on the granting of any final decree of divorce, the wife
shall thereafter be barred of dower in land formerly owned,
then owned, or thereafter acquired by her former husband.
In the instant case the court followed the majority view of
the United States jurisdictions and the only view to be taken
under the common law. By the great weight of authority the
courts do not have jurisdiction over the property of the parties
to a divorce proceeding unless such jurisdiction be given by
statute. The South Carolina Divorce Act does not give the
courts jurisdiction over the property of the spouses other
than to the extent of awarding alimony and attorney's fees.
Statutes giving the court power to award property of the husband to the wife in divorce proceedings have enlarged the
rights of the wife to the degree that such rights are now
greater than if she were to remain married. Historically the
wife was entitled only to the right of support from her husband. Upon dissolution of the marriage the alimony award
is substituted for the right of support and is sufficient to keep
the wife from becoming a burden on society.
CARL W. LITTLEJOHN, JR.

STATE SALES AND USE TAX-Exemptions Under Atomic Energy Act. Actions to test the validity of state sales and
use taxes were brought by Roane-Anderson Company and
others, and by Carbide and Carbon Chemicals Corporation
and others against Sam K. Carson, Commissioner of Finance
and Taxation for the State of Tennessee. Roane-Anderson
manages the government-owned town of Oak Ridge, Tennessee; Carbide and Carbon Chemicals Corporation operates the
Oak Ridge plants for the production of fissionable materials.
Both companies operate under cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts
with the Atomic Energy Commission. Judgments of the Chancery Court, in favor of the Commissioner of Finance and Taxation, were reversed by the Supreme Court of Tennessee. The
court held that respondents were independent contractors and
as such were not exempt from state taxes as there was no
implied constitutional immunity attaching to independent contractors by virtue of contracts with a government agency;
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however, the taxes are prohibited by Section 9(b) of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1946. On certiorari, affirmed by the
Supreme Court of the United States. HELD: Purchase and
use of materials and supplies by private corporations, in performance of cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts with the Atomic
Energy Commission, were activities of Commission exempt
from state sales and use taxes under Atomic Energy Act of
1946, exempting "activities" of Commission from taxation by
state, county, municipality, or subdivision thereof. Carson v.
Roane-Anderson Co., ___ U. S. ___, 72 S. Ct. 257 96 L. Ed.
198 (1950).
Possessions, institutions, and activities of the Federal Government are not, in the absence of express congressional consent, subject to any form of state taxation. U. S. v. County of
Allegheny, 322 U. S. 174, 64 S. Ct. 908, 88 L. Ed. 1209 (1944).
For instance, a state may not impose a tax upon the privilege
of selling gas to the Federal Government for use of its Coast
Guard Fleet or Veterans Hospital. Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 27 U. S. 218, 48 S. Ct. 451, 72 L. Ed. 857, 56 A. L. R.
583 (1928). The Atomic Energy Commission is an agency of
the Federal Government, and is entitled to all the privileges,
immunities and rights of the Federal Government, including
that of immunity from state and local taxation. Graves v.
People of State of N. Y. ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U. S. 466, 59 S.
Ct. 593, 83 L. Ed. 927 (1939). Further, congress has power
to provide tax immunities to a Corporation created by it to
facilitate the performance of its governmental functions, such
as the Home Owner's Loan Corp. Pittman v. Home Owner's
Loan Corp., 308 U. S. 21, 60 S. Ct. 15, 84 L. Ed. 11, 124 A.
L. R. 1263 (1939). Exemptions of the Federal Land Bank
from state taxes extends to sales taxes on purchase made to
repair buildings on land acquired by foreclosure of a mortgage.
Federal Land Bank of St. Paul v. Bismark Lumber Co., 314
U. S. 95, 62 S. Ct. 1, 86 L. Ed. 65 (1941). But a state can exact occupation tax from independent contractors who are not
creatures of the Federal Government since money earned becomes part of gross earnings and the government is no longer
concerned with what contractors might be required to pay as
tax upon privilege of doing business within the state. Silas
Mason Co. v. State Tax Commission, 302 U. S. 190, 82 L. Ed.
193 (1936). Nor does a state tax laid upon the gross receipts
of an independent contractor, derived from building locks
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and dams for the Federal Government within the borders of
the state, interfere with the performance of federal functions
and is a valid exaction. James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302
U. S. 134, 58 S. Ct. 208, 82 L. Ed. 155, 114 A. L. R. 318 (1937).
General Constr. Co. v. Fisher,295 U. S. 715, 55 S. Ct. 646, 97
A. L. R. 1252 (1934). Neither is a contractor carrying mail
immune, as an agency of the Federal Government, from state
taxation of property used in performance of the contract, even
though the tax is based on the gross receipts of his contract
as the burden upon the government is only remote. Alward v.
Johnson, 282 U. S. 509, 51 S. Ct. 273, 75 L. Ed. 496, 75 A. L.
R. 9 (1931). No unconstitutional taxation of means or instrumentalities of the Federal Government is involved in the imposition of a state excise tax on gasoline consumed by a contractor with the government in the performance of a contract
for constructing levees. Trinity Farm Constr. Co. v. GrosJean,
291 U. S. 466, 54 S. Ct. 469, 78 L. Ed. 918 (1934). The constitutional immunity of the Federal Government is not infringed
by a state sales tax upon materials purchased by a contractor
for use in carrying out a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract with the
government. The Constitution unaided does not prohibit nondiscriminatory state taxation of contractors with the United
States, merely because the burden is passed on as a part of the
construction cost. State of Ala. v. King and Boozer, 314 U. S.
1, 62 S. Ct. 43, 86 L. Ed. 3, 140 A. L. R. 615 (1941). A use tax
is valid on materials purchased in another state for use in
performing a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract with the United
States, even though title to goods passes to government on
shipment by seller, and the government reserves the decision
whether to buy or not, where the contract clearly contemplates
the contractor buying in his own name and on his own credit.
Curry v. U. S., 314 U. S. 14, 62 S. Ct. 48, 86 L. Ed. 9 (1941).
The result of the Roane-Anderson case is, as a practical
matter, a total reversal of previous Supreme Court decisions
pertaining to independent contractors working on cost-plusfixed-fee contracts with the government. It remains to be seen
just how far the court will go in extending this immunity to
contractors performing similar government contracts. It is
not yet clear whether the court was striving for a particular
result in the instant case or whether it intended setting a precedent which will allow a general change of policy in our political and economic system. The tenuous ground upon which
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the decision is founded, the broad interpretation of "Activities," leads to the conclusion that the court was only attempting to reduce the tremendous Atomic Energy expenditures;
however, it isn't yet clear as to how far the tax immunity
-will extend even if restricted to the Atomic Energy Program.
The court's interpretation of "Activities" could as logically be
applied to any contractor working under a government agency,
and it is doubtful that Congress has authority to bestow such
sweeping tax exemptions upon private enterprise. The decision seems highly questionable since one of the justifications
of the tremendous expenditures for Atomic Energy is that
private enterprise is to have free access to patents, etc., developed by the program. Under this decision these valuable
benefits will be attained free from state taxation which is
contrary to our system of non-discriminatory taxation. Further, Congress has in the past specifically refused to allow
such exemptions; thus, the Supreme Court has done by implied immunity that which Congress refused to do by legislation.
FRED BLACKWELL

CRIMINAL LAW-Right of Defendant to Withdraw a Plea
of Guilty When the Motion is Timely Made. The defendant
was indicted in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida for attempting to evade income
taxes by filing a false return. The defendant in the presence
of his counsel and in full understanding of the consequences
changed his plea from not guilty to guilty. No elements of
coercion, mistake, fear or inadvertence were involved in the
defendant's change of plea. Four months thereafter, just before sentence by the District Court, the defendant moved to
withdraw his plea of guilty and enter a plea of not guilty.
The defendant's motion was denied and he was convicted on
his plea of guilty. On appeal HELD, affirmed. While a motion
to change a plea of guilty is within the reviewable discretion
of the District Court and is usually granted if the defendant
made his plea in ignorance of his rights or as a result of fear,
coercion, or mistake, it was not an abuse of discretion to deny
such a plea where defendant's plea of guilty was made in
the presence of competent counsel with full understanding of
the consequences and the defendant's only justification for
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his motion is that he was surprised by the severity of the
sentence imposed. Williams v. United States, 192 Fed. 2d 39
(1951).
A defendant has no absolute right at common law to withdraw a plea of guilty, United States v. Denniston, 89 Fed. 2d
696 (1937), but some statutes provide that the plea of guilty
may be withdrawn at any time before sentence as a matter
of right. Kentucky Criminal Code of Practice, Section 366.
Ordinarily, permission to withdraw the plea of guilty is
within the trial court's discretion. State v. Harvey, 128 S. C.
477, 123 S. E. 201 (1924) ; State v. Branner, 149 N. C. 559,
63 S. E. 169 (1908). A majority of the courts hold that the
exercise of this discretion is subject to review, and will be
reversed if there is an abuse of discretion. State v. Harvey,
128 S. C. 447, 123 S. E. 201 (1924) ; Greene v. State, 88 Ark.
290, 114 S. W. 447 (1908). Even though the majority holds
the discretion of the trial court reviewable the trial courts'
ruling is usually affirmed where it is based on conflicting evidence and the court was forced to come to a conclusion.
Dobosky v. State, 183 Ind. 488, 109 N. E. 742 (1915). A
minority holds that the discretion to grant or deny a motion
for withdrawal of the plea of guilty is an absolute one, the
exercise of which will not be reviewed. Commonwealth v.
Ingersoll, 145 Mass. 381, 14 N. E. 449 (1888). Under the
majority view to successfully attack a refusal by the trial
court to allow a withdrawal of the plea of guilty, the accused
must show that such plea should not be allowed to stand
against him because of some reason existing when it was
entered, but for which he would not have entered the plea,
and that reason must amount to a fraud or an imposition upon
him, or a misapprehension of his legal right. Rachel v. United
States, 61 Fed. 2d 362 (1932). A motion to withdraw a plea
of guilty should not be denied, where a proper showing for its
allowance is made, merely because defendant on a trial might
or probably would be found guilty; and while the burden is
on the accused to show cause for the change of his plea, the
court's discretion should be exercised liberally, so as to promote the ends of justice and to safeguard the life and liberty
of the accused, especially when the accused is not assisted by
counsel and his motion is timely. Bergen v. United States,
145 Fed. 2d 181 (1944). Defendant's contention that he did
not know that he would be subjected to a severe sentence
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when he entered the plea of guilty is not sufficient grounds
for reversing the trial court's refusal to permit withdrawal
of the plea. United States v. Colonna, 142 Fed. 2d 210 (1944).
However, the least surprise or influence causing a defendant
to plead guilty when he has any defense at all should be sufficient ground for the court to allow a withdrawal of the plea
of guilty. State v. Williams, 45 La. Ann, 1357, 14 So. 32
(1893).
The holding of the principal case appears to be in conformity with the majority and the better view; for the cases
show that if the plea of guilty was entered due to coercion,
surprise, or fraud the courts do not hesitate to allow a withdrawal of the plea. Despite this general tendency to grant the
plea it has been emphasized that the presumption is in favor
of the ruling of the trial court and their refusal to grant a
motion to change a plea of guilty will be affirmed unless the
defendant is able to show some grounds for the application.
The courts are correct in not attempting to lay down a general rule as to when the court should or should not allow the
defendant to withdraw the plea of guilty; for except where
controlled by statute this is within the reviewable discretion
of the court, such discretion being exercised according to
the facts of each particular case. The tendency of the courts
is to allow the plea of guilty to be withdrawn if the accused
has any credible grounds on which to base his motion, and
it appears from the facts of the case that justice will not be
served unless the accused's motion is allowed.
D. L. ERWIN

CRIMINAL LAW-Right of Accused to Have Counsel Appointed in Non-Capital Cases. Defendant instituted habeas corpus proceedings in a state court after being convicted of
armed robbery. The conviction was based on a plea of guilty.
He alleged that the plea was entered without the assistance of
counsel, and as a result of statements made by officer which
led him to believe the charge was one of breaking and entering. The petition and answer alleged that defendant had been
confined to an institution for the mentally deficient. Petition
was dismissed by the state court. On appeal, HELD, reversed.
The due process clause of the fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution requires States to afford assist-
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ance of counsel in non-capital cases when there are special
circumstances, such as mental deficiency, indicating that the
accused could not have a fair and adequate defense without
the aid of counsel. Dominic Palmer v. Stanley P. Ashe,
U. S. ___, 96 L. Ed. 130 (1951).
The fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides; "No state shall . . . deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law." Repeatedly the United States Supreme Court has held that this
Amendment requires States to furnish defendant assistance
of counsel in non-capital cases when there are special circumstances indicating that the accused could not obtain a fair
and adequate defense without counsel. Uverges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U. S. 437, 93 L. Ed. 127, 67 S. Ct. 184 (1948).
However, by statute and constitutional law, a minority of
states, including South Carolina, have limited the power to
appoint counsel for defense only in capital cases. Loggins v.
State, 136 Tex. Cr. 549, 125 S. W. 2d 565 (1939). State v.
Jones, 172 S. C. 129, 173 S. E. 77 (1933). Generally, a majority of the courts have appointed counsel for mentally deficient defendants, Grogant v. Commonwealth, 222 Ky. 484, 1
S. W. 2d 779 (1927); for they hold, that under special circumstances, the court is charged with the responsibility to
appoint counsel without request. Commonwealth v. Jones, 297
Pa. 326, 146 A. 905 (1929). Recognizing this right to counsel
as being a part of the fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution, the Alabama court defined the special circumstances as being in consideration of age, ignorance, or
mental capacity, but not insolvency. Johnson v. Mayo, 25 Ala.
2d 772, 40 So. 2d 134 (1949). However, the California court
held the appointment of counsel could be made upon a showing by defendant of insufficient funds to pay an attorney.
Dorris v. Crowder, 26 Cal. App. 2d 49, 78 P. 2d 1039 (1938).
Most jurisdictions follow California in holding that a finding
of the indigence of the accused is within the discretion of
the court. State v. Gomez, 89 Vt. 490, 96 A. 190 (1915). Ignorance as a result of lack of formal education, and not actual
mental deficiency, is not considered special circumstances such
that warrant the court to appoint counsel for accused of a
non-capital crime. State v. Hedgepath, 228 N C. 259, 45 S. E.
2d 563 (1947).
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In the instant case, Mr. Justice Black did not define or
prescribe a test to determine the special circumstances under
which a state is required to afford assistance of counsel; however, the Supreme Court did establish mental deficiency as
sufficient to warrant the appointment of counsel. Generally,
the state courts have agreed as to mental incompacity, yet,
there is inconsistency as to other circumstances that are
deemed adequate to require appointment of counsel. The inconsistences are indicative of the fact that different jurisdictions have different needs to appoint counsel. Certain circumstances are conclusive in themselves to warrant the appointment of counsel, but the majority of the sufficient circumstances would each be an exception within itself. This decision is made in the interest of the propagation of justice
by placing in the discretion of the court the power to determine some of the circumstances whereby the court must appoint counsel for all accused in a non-capital case.
RUTHIE WILLIAMS
TRIAL-Competency of Objectionable Testimony When
Brought Out by Objecting Party on Cross-Examination. In
May, 1926, appellant issued to respondent a life insurance
policy containing a total and permanent disability clause
which provided for a $50.00 monthly income should the respondent become totally and permanently disabled. The respondent brings suit in this action to recover the total and
permanent disability payments provided for in the policy.
The court allowed the respondent, over the objection of the
appellant, to testify as to what his future earnings would have
been had he remained in his former employment. The appellant subsequently referred to the same testimony on crossexamination by bringing out the salary scale of the respondent. Error is assigned as to the admissibility of this testimony. On appeal, HELD, affirmed. Where the respondent is
allowed to testify over the objection of the appellant, and
the appellant later brings out the same testimony on crossexamination without eliciting reservation of the objection, the
testimony then becomes competent and will afford no basis
for an appeal from the judgment. Goudelock v. PrudentialInsurance Company of America, ___ S. C. ___, 65 S. E. 2d 114
(1951).
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Admission of testimony of witnesses, if error, is harmless
where witnesses were cross-examined upon that testimony
without reservation of the previous objection. Nock v. Fidelity
and Deposit Co., 175 S. C. 188, 178 S. E. 839 (1935) ; Snipes
v. Augusta-Aiken Ry. and Electric Corporation, et al., 151
S. C. 391, 149 S. E. 111 (1929). This point is illustrated in
Mathis v. Southern Ry. Co., 53 S. C. 246, 31 S. E. 240 (1939),
where it was held in a suit for personal injuries, that even
though respondent's testimony as to his marriage and the
number of his children was not material, when appellant
called forth the same testimony from the witness on crossexamination, he was then unable to except to appellant's testimony. In The South CarolinaTerminal Co. v. South Carolina
and Georgia Railroad Co., 52 S. C. 1, 29 S. E. 565 (1897) the
learned judge held that irrelevant testimony, after its introduction by both parties, had no more effect than irrelevant
testimony which is withdrawn, by the judge, from the consideration of the jury. In line with the foregoing rules as to
incompetent testimony being pursued on cross-examination
are the rules as to such testimony where only direct examination is concerned. It was held in Knight .v. Sullivan Power
Co., 140 S. C. 296, 138 S. E. 818 (1927) that on direct examination, objection to testimony is waived where like testimony
is not objected to when given by another witness. The same
rule applies to testimony entirely by the same witness. Young
v. McNeill, 78 S. C. 143, 59 S. E. 986 (1907). However, referring again to cross-examination, Horres v. Berkeley Chemical Co., 57 S. C. 189, 35 S. E. 226 (1926) held that appellant
does not waive his right to except on appeal to testimony admitted over his objection, by cross-examining the witnesses
on the same point or by offering testimony in his own behalf
in reply on the same line. In Green v. Shaw, 136 S. C. 56, 134
S. E. 226 (1926), which is in line with the Horres case, supra,
Justice Stabler justifies his decision in saying, "We are unable to see why a litigant who has duly objected to the admission of incompetent testimony should be required to choose
between foregoing the opportunity to acomplish such legitimate purposes (as testing the credibility of witnesses or combating the effect of the testimony upon the minds of the jury)
through cross-examination of the testifying witness and waiving his right of appeal based on the court's error in admitting
the testimony."
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In the instant case, the court had ruled, on other grounds,
that the testimony in question was admissible from its original introduction by the respondent. The issue under consideration, therefore, was not squarely before the court. Even so,
in the light of other cases, it appears that two distinct and
contradictory views have prevailed. (1) Even though the rule
in the case of Green v. Shaw, supra, does seem to be justifed
by the learned judge, there are very few cases which are in
accord with his decision. (2) The other rule, that objection to
testimony is waived by subsequent reference thereto upon
cross-examination has two phases. The Mathis case, supra,
makes no mention of an objection being reserved. The Smith
ease, supra, and the Nock case, supra, both say that an objection is cured where the same testimony is brought out without
reservation of the objection. This view seems to be the weight
of authority in the United States. It can be inferred from
these holdings, then, that the converse of the rule is that
reservation of the objection, which in fact is the taking exception to the order overruling an objection, would allow the appellant to refer to the objectionable testimony on cross-examination and still retain his right to appeal from the order. Such
a rule would meet the qualifications inferred from the Iatter
cases and also afford the appellant the right to cross-examine
for the reasons outlined by the Green ease, supra.
JAMES WARNER ALFORD
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